We can now establish that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible due to two factors: the first derives from the idea that having free will means having a choice about the certainty of our actions, and that having a choice depends on the presence of options real. This dilemma is present in Peter Kreeft's story analogy, here the presence of an omniscient author (God) does not allow a real choice if our actions are actually determined by the outcome of the story and not by our choice. The second factor comes from the idea that truth and the presence of predetermination mean that we do not cause our actions in any meaningful way and that our actions are not ultimately controlled by us. In other words, we lack the capacity for self-determination. This dilemma is present in Augustine's subsequent notion of Massa Damnata, here God, due to our tendency to sin, has already predetermined who will be a sinner and who will be saved, a controversial notion which only further aggravates the fact that foreknowledge and free will are