One of the main conclusions of the article concerns the optimal income taxation pursued by Scandinavian countries as part of their efforts towards income redistribution. The use of optimal policy is a way to achieve income redistribution by relying on third parties to effectively identify potential tax sources. The combination of small subsidies and distortions of fiscal transfers contributes to the optimal efficiency of the policy, while justifying the high taxes in the Scandinavian countries. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The collective responsibility of people who work hard and are willing to benefit from a fair system provides the ground for tax distortions where collective tax rates burdened by individuals can reach 60-70%. Non-tax incentives help support a commitment to productivity that is complementary to the government's ability to lower the prices of goods and services. The use of optimal income taxation is informed by the need to link an important social welfare function with the maximization of total individual utilities. The provision of public goods is prioritized as a function of government alongside income redistribution to ensure that the less privileged have a relatively equal footing in accessing basic services. A key part of the high tax burden is the absence of distortions on individual behavior once the optimal policy is applied, which indicates the need to make the decision to increase taxes through efficient provision of public services. Furthermore, distortionary taxes are justified by a lack of perfect sources of information that could allow governments to have direct knowledge of individuals' wealth. The ability to limit the escalation of individual behavior considering high taxes is linked to the provision of complementary incentives to work where expenses for child care, elderly care, transportation, healthcare and education they are highly subsidized (Kleven 90). Justification for optimal income taxation is also advanced through anomalous ownership in most Scandinavian countries where spending on participation subsidies has a multiplier effect on employment as workers aspire to higher productivity. For example, optimal fiscal theory strengthens the argument about how the optimality of subsidizing child care is complementary to labor supply because it has a reducing effect on the total effective distortion. The arguments for incentives instill a sense of low to negative tax rates on goods that are supposed to incentivize labor supply such as child care, transportation, and education, among others. However, optimal commodity taxation must be pursued alongside a tax regime that pushes for different tax approaches driven by individual income capabilities and endowments (Brunner, Eckerstorfer, and Pech 116). In addition to the tax on labor income, Scandinavian countries have pushed for proportional taxes targeting wealth and other goods that can strengthen the welfare-maximizing system that draws from optimal taxation. Low participation tax rates or the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) are observed in the optimal tax model by a wide margin where policy tools such as child care and elder care are included. The model provides a clear indication of the positive correlation betweendemand for child care and work, which increases to the ability to pursue effective means of income redistribution (Kleven 92). Scandinavian countries have attempted to choose a parameter such as child care from which an optimal spending ceiling is allocated to the subsidy to allow programs such as the EITC to achieve the desired result. Furthermore, measures against tax evasion create the necessary trust that strengthens the cultural psyche of the Scandinavian countries. Use information pathways, broad tax bases, and complements to define the sociocultural environment under which high taxes have succeeded. An unfortunate conclusion from the research on Scandinavian taxation is the way in which the efficiency of the tax system depends on revenue expenditure. For example, governments are pressured by their spending to adjust taxes. However, spending cannot be the only reason for fiscal distortions as citizens may be too burdened by the tax burden. Scandinavian countries tend to spend large sums of money on transfer programs to strengthen the well-being of their citizens (Kleven 87). A similar approach cannot be extrapolated to other countries that do not invest in developing citizen programs. Indeed, an excessive tax burden would frustrate citizens. Government commitment to the well-being of citizens is essential in determining the basis of resource allocation. However, transfer programs cannot be the only type of investment for the government. In fact, the allocation of resources should be balanced between welfare programs and development programs so that the government can regenerate the funds used. Investments in transfer programs are perceived as subsidies used to improve job health (Gillitzer, Kleven, and Slemrod 242). Furthermore, they tend to mask the distortionary aspect of taxes. However, governments are encouraged to find other means of revenue rather than taxation. Taxes tend to demoralize work and negatively affect productivity. Countries that charge excessive taxes tend to have a high incidence of tax evasion. Furthermore, investments in tax programs tend to affect the aggregate supply of labor. When countries insist on relocation programs for unemployed and senile citizens, they construct new comfort zones for citizens. Citizens may exhibit dismissal issues because they do not see the need to solicit jobs. Scandinavian tax programs are highly effective and rely on strong cultures and incentives to stimulate workforce participation. The culture built in these countries is that work should be independent of earnings as the government is expected to shoulder most of the expenses. The government also makes a deliberate effort to lower the prices of goods and services in the consumer market. Therefore, the labor participation tax system and forces in the consumer market are aligned. The main problem with such a system is that the tax system is influenced by social motivations. Tax morality becomes difficult to establish when dealing with citizens of different origins and characteristics (Kleven 93). According to Brunner, Eckerstorfer and Pech (108) argue that optimal tax models should be developed considering the variations in wealth in the country. Since taxes in the labor market could lead to layoffs and low productivity, excessive taxation in the sector must be avoided. The important element is to seek balance by tapping into the raw materials market to bring an aspect of equality. Once again, the authors highlight the need to use optimal taxation of,033.