In recent decades, the number of immigrants in South Korea has increased dramatically. Therefore, it is inevitable that South Korea will transform from a homogeneous nation-state to a “multicultural society.” So what exactly does “multiculturalism” mean to South Korea, and what is the role of the South Korean government in addressing this significant influx of immigrants into South Korea? Therefore, this article analyzes South Korea's laws and policies regarding immigration and integration. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay Existing immigrant policies in South Korea focus on the two largest groups of immigrants in South Korea: migrant workers and migrant brides. These policies equate the South Korean government's failure to provide equal legal citizenship rights to these two immigrant groups with “ethnic nationalism” and equate the extension of equal legal citizenship rights with “multiculturalism” (Lim, 2003; Lee and Park, 2005; This body of scholarship effectively applies the concepts of ethnic nationalism and multiculturalism in order to suggest continuity in the South Korean state's ethnically homogeneous understanding of the Korean nation. However, this body of scholarship reveals shortcomings in using a narrow legal focus and in failing to define both the terms “ethnic nationalism” and “multiculturalism.” Therefore, these concepts cannot fully explain why and how South Korea's “multicultural” immigration laws and policies fail to include immigrants as members of the South Korean nation. While this document recognizes that South Korea's multicultural society contains a wide variety of minority ethnic and cultural groups, this document focuses on state laws and policies on migrant workers and migrant brides. From 1988 onwards, South Korean governments revised Korea's immigration laws and policies to allow the influx of immigrants. Initially, they began to allow temporary immigration of migrant workers. The administration subsequently began facilitating permanent immigration of marriage migrants. Therefore, the number of migrants in Korea rapidly increased to 2,416,503 in 2019, or 4.6% of the total population. This rapid increase in inward migration has created pressure to redefine Korea's monoethnic national identity. As a result, from 2006 onwards the administration began implementing “multiculturalism” as state policy. So, how do South Korea's “multicultural” immigration and integration laws and policies regulate South Korea's criteria of national belonging, and how do these laws and policies affect the inclusion of immigrants as citizens South Koreans? To answer these questions, we will examine immigration and integration laws and policies affecting labor migrants, the largest group of short-term migrants, and marriage migrants, the largest group of long-term migrants. We will first examine migrant worker immigration laws and policies. When Korean workers began to give importance to their labor rights in the 1980s, their living standards increased and they became reluctant to perform labor-intensive jobs (Kim, 2004). Therefore, in 1987, the small and medium-sized business sector faced a labor shortage of unskilled and low-skilled workers (Gray, 2007). To address this issue, laws and policies have been implemented tofacilitate the temporary migration of low-skilled male migrant workers to Korea. In doing so, these laws and policies maximize the economic benefits of labor migration while maintaining its presumed ethnic homogeneity. In 1994, the Industrial Trainee System (ITS) was introduced which promoted the temporary migration of low-skilled migrant workers. Under this system, the government assigned the Korea Small Business Federation (KFSB).to recruit migrant workers as “trainees”. Although officially designated as “trainees,” Korean companies did not provide training to these migrant workers. Instead, these companies expected migrant workers to perform two years of manual labor before returning to their home countries. Despite migrant workers' expectations to pursue the “Korean Dream,” their relationship with Korean society quickly soured as ITSs exploited both non-ethnic people and economically exploited ethnic Korean migrant workers (Lim, 2006). For example, the ITS excluded “trainees” from coverage under the Korean Labor Standards Law granted to full-time workers, thus lacking basic labor rights (Gray, 2007). Furthermore, the ITS prohibited "trainees" from moving workplaces. Not to mention non-payment of wages, lack of overtime pay, excessive working hours, unsafe working conditions, and non-existent compensation for workplace injuries and verbal, physical, and sexual assaults (Lim, 2006). Not surprisingly, the exploitation of the ITS system has caused a significant backlash from migrant workers. For the expanding civil society movement in Korea, the ongoing violations of migrant workers' human rights have given rise to campaigns to improve migrant workers' rights. Together, their large-scale protests and petition campaigns have led to the extension of small but growing migrant workers' rights. For example, in 1993 the government granted "trainees" the right to compensation for accidents at work, in 1997 the government amended the ITS and granted "trainees" a three-year visa for two years of "internship" and a year of “work,” and in 1998 the government granted protection to both legal and illegal migrant workers under the Labor Standards Act. However, these improvements did not benefit illegal migrant workers, as they did not exercise their rights and report violations of the law due to well-founded fears of being deported (Gray, 2007). Given the inability to solve the problems of ITS, the migrant advocacy movement has attempted to find more effective solutions to the problems of migrant workers. For example, in 1995, migrant support NGOs decided to form the Joint Committee for Migrants in Korea (JCMK). The JCMK has pledged to introduce a new legal framework, the Work Permit System (WPS). This system aimed to abolish ITS, extend the full range of domestic labor rights to all migrant workers, and grant illegal migrant workers in Korea full amnesty. Initially, the government of Kim Dae-Jung, a major supporter of South Korea's democratization movement, tried to implement the WPS in 2000. However, the JCMK's efforts failed until the government of Roh Moo-Hyun, a former defender of human rights, lawyer. In 2004, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration implemented the "Work Permit System" (EPS). This system provided legal migrant workers with comprehensive coverage under the Labor Standards Act. Additionally, illegal migrant workers were offered limited amnesty intime and the possibility to register as workers under the EPS. Therefore the number of illegal migrants has decreased dramatically. However, this system also distinguished between low-skilled migrant workers of ethnic Koreans and non-ethnic Koreans, providing the former with preferential employment and settlement rights and prohibiting the latter from settling permanently in Korea. Therefore, South Korean governments have explicitly designed their labor migration laws and policies to prohibit the permanent settlement in Korea of ​​male, non-ethnic Korean migrant workers. Instead, these same administrations provided ethnic Korean migrants with employment and settlement rights so that they could contribute to South Korea's economy without jeopardizing its ethnic homogeneity. Therefore, the Overseas Korea Act was implemented in 1998 (Nora Kim, 2008). However, the Overseas Korea Act initially benefited only high-skilled Koreans from "advanced" countries such as the United States and excluded low-skilled Koreans from "underdeveloped" countries such as China. In opposition to this discrimination, Korean migrant NGOs waged a vigorous campaign calling for equal treatment of low- and high-skilled ethnic Korean workers based on their shared ethnicity. In response, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration amended the EPS in 2004 to include special work permits for low-skilled Koreans that provided the right to preferential allocation for jobs in the construction and service sectors and the right to change workplace. Additionally, in 2010, the Overseas Korea Act was amended to apply to all ethnic Koreans overseas, regardless of their level of skill or wealth. Therefore, in contrast to the ban on the settlement of non-ethnic, low-skilled Korean migrant workers, South Korean governments have expressly facilitated the permanent immigration of ethnic Korean migrant workers based on their ethnic kinship. In conclusion, South Korea's immigration laws for migrant workers adopt a different ethnocentric and developmentalist form of exclusion based on the absence of a shared ethnicity and the expected economic benefits of labor migration into the country. This can be seen from migrant workers' categorized right to work and settlement along the patrilineal fault line of ethnicity between ethnic Korean male migrant workers and non-ethnic Korean male migrant workers. By facilitating the temporary migration of migrant workers, non-ethnic and ethnic Korean migrant workers are known as a flexible workforce that contributes to the economy of the Korean nation-state. At the same time, banning the permanent residence of low-skilled non-ethnic Korean migrants maintains Korea's supposed ethnic homogeneity. However, as the next topic explains, South Korea's ethnic principle of patrilineal descent also facilitates immigration as successive South Korean governments actively encouraged ethnic Korean men to marry foreign, non-ethnic Korean women with the presumption that they would ethnically and culturally assimilated "Korean". ' families. Now we will look at immigration laws and marriage migrant policies. From 1988 onwards, rising costs of living in urban areas led families to limit their reproductive behavior. Therefore, the Korean fertility rate has fallen from 2.1 children in 1984 to 0.98 children per family in 2018. This declining birth rate gives rise to an aging society. Young Korean women migrate to cities in groups in hopes of finding better oneseducational, employment and marital opportunities. This trend worsens in rural areas. This has resulted in a rural “crisis” as farmers cannot find a wife to extend their family line. To resolve these issues, South Korean governments have implemented laws and policies to facilitate the permanent migration of ethnic Korean and Southeast Asian migrant brides to Korea. This subtopic argues that South Korea's immigration and "multicultural" integration laws and policies have facilitated the immigration of migrant brides to Korea based on the ethnocentric expectation of their socio-cultural assimilability into the Korean family as wives "Koreans", daughters in law and mothers. Therefore, Korean society relegates migrant brides who fail to meet Korean ethno-cultural norms to second-class citizens. From the early 1990s onward, Korean governments began organizing "marriage tours" to encourage marriages between Korean peasants and ethnic Korean-Chinese women. At the time, South Korean society expected these women to be dutiful “Korean” wives and to be an ideal solution to South Korea's demographic problems (Freeman, 2005). However, these expectations did not take into account the desires of migrant brides themselves, such as finding independence, adventure, entrepreneurship, and the desire to lead a “modern” life in a “developed country” (Freeman, 2005). However, these women ended up marrying poor, uneducated husbands who lived in rural villages. To make matters worse, Koreans expected these women to be grateful for the “opportunity” to live in a developed country, expected these women to adopt patriarchal gender roles as caregivers and housewives, and criticized them for not respecting cultural norms. Korean. As a result, these ethnic Korean migrant brides ran away to escape the harsh circumstances in which they found themselves. As a result, measures were taken to limit further "sham marriages". Due to Korea's persistent demographic problems, new legislation was implemented to facilitate marriage. immigration of Southeast Asian migrant brides. For example, the legalization of private marriage brokering in 1999 facilitated the immigration of migrant brides on a commercial basis. Furthermore, in 1997 the Nationality Law was changed so that both male and female spouses of Korean citizens could obtain Korean nationality, but only after a two-year waiting period (Shim, 2012). As a result, migrant brides who divorced their Korean husbands before their naturalization had to leave South Korea. However, from 2004 onwards, non-naturalized migrant brides who divorce their Korean husbands can remain in Korea as long as they take care of their in-laws and Korean children (Hyekyung Lee, 2008). As such, South Korea's "multicultural" immigration and integration laws constituted migrant brides' legal rights and duties as citizens in terms of their roles as "Korean" mothers. Interestingly, despite the fact that these marriage brokers married ethnic Korean men to foreign, non-ethnic Korean women, Korean communities still expect these women to play the roles of “Korean” wives, daughters-in-law, and mothers. This is due to the assumption that “non-Korean women were assimilable to South Korean families” (Abelmann and Kim, 2005). Indeed, private marriage brokers explicitly catered to these expectations by advertising women from Vietnam and the Philippines as “pure” and “traditional” women. According to these advertisements, these migrant brides from "underdeveloped" countries can be.