Section 16 (3) of the Contracts Act, 1957:When a person who is capable of dominating the will of another, enters into a contract with him and the transaction appears , prima facie or on the evidence adduced, inconceivable, the burden of proving that the contract was not made by undue influence lies on the person capable of dominating the will of the other. Section 16(3) has placed an unreasonable agreement as part of demonstrating undue influence. Relying on the Indian case Poosathurai v Kannappa Chettiar, the Privy Council observed that an agreement is considered "unconscionable" under the definition of section 16(3) when the lender is able to dominate the will of the borrower. In the case of Ragunath Prasad v Sarju Prasad, the Privy Council raised the question of whether the lender was capable of dominating the will of the borrower which needs to be resolved before determining whether the arrangement was unconscionable. In National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan, Lord Scarman referred to the Poosathurai case and said that a court could set aside an undervalued transaction as unconscionable if it had been shown or could have been presumed to have been obtained by undue influence. The decision in the Poosathurai case was further reaffirmed in the Polygram Records Sdn Bhd v The Search & Anor case. Therefore, irreconcilability is so closely related to undue influence that it cannot have a separate existence under section 16(3), but is limited to procedural and evidentiary purposes. only.ConclusionThe doctrine of irreconcilability and the related principle of inequality of contractual power are evolutionary areas, still not completely consolidated, of contract law. Although both doctrines share similar objectives which are equitable in nature, p...... middle of paper ...... induced the transaction through the influence given by the party. In Lloyd's Bank v Bundy, Lord Denning suggested the principle of “inequality of bargaining power” according to which contractual validity requires at least some level of fairness. However, in the case of National Westminster Bank v Morgan, Lord Scarman stated that Lord Denning's view led to some confusion and that although the "fact of an unequal deal" will be a "relevant feature in some cases of influence undue", can never become "an adequate basis in principle for an equitable doctrine" regarding commercial contracts. Lord Scarman warned that there is no precisely defined law setting the limits to a court's equitable jurisdiction to relieve against undue influence. This is the world of doctrine, not of precise and orderly rules. . . A court exercising this jurisdiction is a court of conscience.