IntroductionMain Body ~The doctrine of promissory estoppel was established with the intent of preventing injustice. This may occur in circumstances where Party A enters into an agreement with Party B based on contractual legal rights. However, Party A may choose to return to its original agreement as a result, the other party will seek to enforce its strict legal rights. The doctrine originated in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877). The lease required the tenant to carry out repairs upon prior notice. The landlord gave notice of repair within six months. Initially the tenants asked to buy his premises. The landlord then entered into negotiations with the tenants, whereby it also agreed not to enforce the obligations required during the negotiations. Negotiations went on for two months then stopped. The owner sued for failing to make repairs required by the contract. Consistently, the House of Lords held that 'the tenants were entitled to fair compensation against the forfeiture of the contract on the ground that the running of the six-month period had been suspended during negotiations.' Nonetheless, the House of Lords refused to accept the argument, as it was "unsupported by considerations and therefore probably inapplicable". the doctrine in practice. The doctrine emerged through the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd (1947). The appellant had rented a block of flats in London, on a 99 year lease at an annual rent of £2500. During the 1940s, following the outbreak of war and the evacuation from London, they were ... half of paper ...... the doctrine to be removed is not expressed, however there are references to whereby the use of the terms "limit" and "perfection" which is believed to emphasize practical rather than legal advantage. Russel LJ, sees the doctrine through occasional techniques, where the courts can prevent giving effect to the intention of the parties. It further adds that the 'consideration' is considered a 'disabling factor' which is a requirement for a 'valid and subsisting contract'. Russel LJ, does not distinguish the doctrine from the public interest but its formal form. By contrast, Lord Goff also raises doubts, stating that the contract is widely seen as wanting where there is "a doctrine of unnecessary consideration". Professor Dawson further argues that this suggests that the argument is based on the fact that the consideration "tightens the net of applicability too tightly".’