In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.By: Robert S. McNamaraSummary:Robert S. McNamara's book, In Retrospect, tells the story of the journey of a man through the trials and tribulations of what appears to be the greatest fatality of the United States; the Vietnam War. McNamara's personal encounters offer a never-before-heard inside perspective and reveal the truth behind the administration. In the first chapter, McNamara talks about his journey into the Washington spotlight and the three events that shaped his life. The first that marked his life was, at the time, the Great Depression; as many as 25 percent of adult males in this country were unemployed, and McNamara's drive for scholastic excellence stemmed from the fact that neither his mother nor his father attended college. The second and third events that ultimately shaped McNamara's life were attending the University of California at Berkeley and meeting his wife Margaret. From Berkeley to Harvard McNamara outlines his path in politics. From living in a cramped one-bedroom apartment with his wife Marg, to being known as one of the "Whiz Kids," McNamara eventually becomes President Kennedy's secretary of defense and creates a bond between the two men that will last forever . Years: 1961-1963, the Kennedy administration and Vietnam take flight. The assumptions underlying the administration's decisions to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam call into question two very important aspects that would belie the obligation; one, the fall of South Vietnam to communist control and the role and military support of the United States. Discussion of information ties with Southeast Asia has emerged. The lack of government experts has created obstacles. When the Berlin Crisis occurred in 1961 and during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, President Kennedy was able to turn to high-level people such as Llewellyn Thompson, Charles Bohlen, and George Keenan, who knew the Soviets intimately. There were no senior Pentagon or State Department officials with comparable knowledge of Southeast Asia. Ultimately, the administration failed to critically analyze its assumptions and the foundations of its decisions, which inevitably ended in disaster. An epochal decision would soon follow. In July 1965 175,000 American troops were to be sent by the end of the year to defend South Vietnam, and again, by the end of the year in 1966 another 200,000 were to be sent, realizing that the likelihood of the wars ending was almost nothing, however, the fundamental logic expressed everywhere was that Laos is the current key to the entire Southeast Asia area.