Among the main emergency response problems in the Toronto SARS crisis, the following can be mentioned: Although Health Canada was aware of the spread of an atypical pneumonia in Asia, and despite the massive arrival at Toronto airport of passengers from the Far East, no measures were taken to monitor these arriving passengers or to alert the medical service to the risk of having to treat patients suffering from the disease mentioned. (VARLEY, 2005)Without adequate information, Scarborough-Grace Emergency after being sought out by Tse Chi Kwai - a 43-year-old man who within days had lost his mother to what was diagnosed primarily as the flu -; whose symptoms were fever, tremors, difficulty breathing and cough; he proceeded to be admitted to the emergency room, alongside many other patients. Furthermore, demonstrating Toronto's lack of preparedness in dealing with the new disease, Mr. Kwai's difficulty breathing was alleviated by the use of BiPAP, recently recognized as causing the most severe spread of the infectious virus. (VARLEY, 2005) At that point, although the disease had not yet been given a name and although its actual severity was not fully known, health workers should have been alerted to the possibility of dealing with infected patients and treating any suspected cases with all precautions required for a highly contagious disease, for example isolating the patient. Faced with SARS, Toronto's emergency medical system proceeded without necessary precautions; its professionals once did not even consider the possibility of being in contact with a dangerous and unknown infectious disease. The lack of information, in addition to endangering other patients seeking medical care, also puts the health of doctors, nurses and other medical assistants at risk. Accustomed to treating infectious diseases without adequate protective equipment, such as gloves, glasses, gowns and masks, medical personnel treated Tse and other patients infected with SARS without any precautions. The aforementioned careless procedure contributed to the infection of many medical professionals and the subsequent spread of the disease in Toronto. In the midst of the SARS crisis, it became clear that there was considerable confusion over who was actually responsible for overcoming the crisis. crisis and what the exact attribution of each department involved was. The poor synergy between Toronto Public Health (THP) and the Ontario Department of Public Health contributed to the poor tracing of people potentially infected with SARS and the uncontrolled spread of the disease.